Galatian War

War between the Galatian Gauls and the Roman Republic fought in 189 BC
Galatian War

A map showing the location of Galatia.
Date189 BC
Location
Galatia, Asia Minor, present day Turkey
Result Roman Allied victory
Belligerents
  • Galatians
    • Tolistobogii
    • Tectosagi
    • Trocmi
Roman Republic
Pergamum
Commanders and leaders
Eposognatus
Orgiagon
Chiomara
Komboiomaros
Gaulotos
Gnaeus Manlius Vulso
Attalus II
Strength
Over 50,000 men (overstated) 30 - 35,000 Romans and allied forces
2,800 Pergamese troops

The Galatian War was a war between the Galatian Gauls and the Roman Republic supported by their allies Pergamum in 189 BC. The war was fought in Galatia in central Asia Minor, in present-day Turkey.

The Romans had just defeated the Seleucids in the Roman-Syrian War and had forced them to thereby sue for peace. Following this recently successful operation in Syria, the Romans then turned their attention towards the Gallic tribes of Galatia who had emigrated to Asia Minor almost 100 years before the current military engagement. Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, the consul, excused the invasion by saying that it was in retaliation for the Galatians supplying troops to the Seleucids during the war. Vulso embarked on this campaign without the permission of the Roman Senate. Joined by Pergamum, the Romans marched inland and attacked the Galatians. They defeated the Galatians in a battle on Mount Olympus and followed up the victory by defeating a larger army near Ancyra (modern Ankara, Turkey).

These defeats forced the Galatians to sue for peace and the Romans returned to the coast of Asia Minor. However, when Manlius Vulso returned to Rome, he was charged with threatening the peace between the Seleucids and Rome. He was cleared and was granted a triumph by the Senate.

Prelude

In 191 BC, Antiochus the Great, the Emperor of the Seleucid Empire of Asia, invaded Greece.[1] The Romans decided to intervene and they defeated the Seleucids at the Battle of Thermopylae.[2] The defeat by Rome forced the Seleucids to retreat back to Asia Minor.[3] The Romans followed them across the Aegean Sea and together with their allies, Pergamum, decisively defeated the Seleucids at the Battle of Magnesia.[4]

The Seleucids sued for peace and began settling it with Scipio Asiaticus.[5] In spring, the new consul, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, arrived to take control of the army from Scipio Asiaticus. He was sent to conclude the treaty Scipio was arranging.[6] However, he was not content with the task given to him and he started to plan a new war. He addressed the soldiers and congratulated them on their victory and then proposed a new war, against the Gauls of Galatia in Asia Minor.[7] The pretext he used for the invasion was that the Galatians had supplied soldiers to the Seleucid army at the Battle of Magnesia.[6][7][8] The principal reason for the invasion was Vulso's desire to seize the wealth of the Galatians, who had become rich from plundering their neighbors, and to gain glory for himself.[8]

Vulso arrived at Ephesus in 189 BC, probably during the month of March or April.[9] Vulso assumed command of Scipio's army, who were now idle since the Seleucids had been defeated.[10][11] A proposal had been introduced in the Roman Senate to reduce the size of Vulso's army, but it was defeated.[12] The historian John D. Grainger thus argues that the Senate was aware of the likelihood of a war with the Galatians, or that it had allowed the continued deployment of the army to counterbalance the Seleucids.[13] For the size of this army, Grainger arrives at a possible range of 30 to 35 thousand total soldiers, including those fielded by the allies.[14]

This war was the first occasion on which a Roman general had started a war without the permission of the senate or the people.[6] This was a dangerous precedent and became an example for the future.[6]

Manlius started his preparations for by summoning the Pergamese to help.[7] However, the King of Pergamum, Eumenes II, was in Rome, so his brother, Attalus II, who was serving as regent, took command of the Pergamese army.[7] He joined the Roman army a few days later with 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.[15]

March inland

The combined Roman-Pergamese army started their march from Ephesus. They advanced inland passing Magnesia on the Maeander and the city of Alabanda where they were met by 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry led by Attalus' brother, Athenaios.[16][17] They then marched to Antiochia where they were met by Antiochus' son, Seleucus, who offered food supplies as part of the treaty that was being concluded.[18] The army then marched through the mountainous regions of Caria, Phrygia and Pisidia.[19] Grainger notes that the army passed through or encamped at cities like Gordion, Tabae and Eriza/Erez (now Erzincan); these cities were relatively poorer than those to the immediate north: Aphrodisias, Heraclea at Latmus, Apollonia and Themisonium. Grainger argues that Vulso chose not to pass through these wealthier cities because they were fortified by the Seleucids and an attack on them could trigger a new war. Grainger thus posits that Vulso's primary intent in this campaign was to weaken Seleucid allies, not to loot.[20]

The army then advanced into the territory of Cibyra, ruled by the tyrant Moagetes/Moegetes. Moagetes was able to persuade Vulso to accept 100 talents of silver as indemnity and promised to provide him with 1,000 medimnoi (40,000 kgs) of wheat.[21][22] When Vulso crossed the River Colobatus, he was met by ambassadors from the town of Sinda in Pisidia. The ambassadors asked for assistance against the city of Termessus who had taken over all their country except for the capitol.[23]

An old map showing the regions of Asia Minor.

The consul agreed to the offer. He entered Termessian territory, allowing them to enter his alliance for fifty talents and for their withdrawal from Sindian territory.[23] Vulso proceeded to seize the city of Cormasa in Pisidia and with it a large booty. Grainger notes that Vulso did not fully enter Pamphylia and instead chose to travel north.[24] He then took the city of Lysinoe before accepting a tribute of fifty talents and 20,000 medimni of barley and wheat from the city of Sagalassus.[25] Grainger provides a lower bound of 275 talents of silver and 60,000 medimnoi of grain for the total loot during the campaign;[26] the food being sufficient for 41 days for about 35000 soldiers.[27] He notes that Vulso had thus extracted a substantial amount of money and food from probable Seleucid allies, thus reducing the resources they could have provided to the Seleucids for a new war.[24]

The consul reached the Rhotrine Springs and he was once again met by Seleucus, who took the injured and sick Romans with him to Apamea and provided some guides to the Romans.[28] Vulso, like he did during his previous marches, took care to avoid Seleucid controlled cities; namely Seleucia Sidera, Apollonia, Lysias and Dokimeion. Grainger argues that the guides provided by Seleucus were not helping the Romans with navigation but with safe passage. The Romans found the cities on their route deserted; Livy says this was due to fear of the Romans, Grainger argues it could have been a Seleucid measure to avoid skirmishes and thus protect the truce. The Romans instead marched from Acoridos Come to Metropolis, then to Synnada and finally Beudos.[29]

They marched for three days after departing from the springs and on the third day they arrived on the border with the Tolistobogii, one of the three Galatian tribes.[30] The consul held an assembly and addressed his troops about the upcoming war. He then sent envoys to Eposognatus, the chief of a section of the Tolistobogii, the only chief who was friendly with Pergamum.[30] The envoys returned and replied that the chief of the Tolistobogii had requested the Romans not to invade his territory. He also claimed that he would attempt to force the surrender of the other chief.[31] Eposognatus did not have power over all members of the Tolistobogii, and was the only Galatian chief who had chosen to not ally with Antiochos and the Seleucids and had not sent them troops. The Galatians were not a unified polity, their tribes and chiefs could each act independently.[32]

The army marched deeper inland and pitched camp near a Galatian stronghold called Cuballum/Caballum, where Vulso had captured what can be assumed to be an Galatian oppidum. While they were there, the Galatian cavalry attacked the army's advance guard, drove it back towards the Roman camp and caused significant casualties. Then the Roman cavalry counter-attacked and drove back the Galatians who might have broken formations. The Galatian attack might have been intended for reconnaissance.[33] The consul, knowing that he was in reach of the enemy, decided to move forward more cautiously.[31]

Battle of Mount Olympus

The Dying Gaul, a Hellenistic Greek impression of a Galatian soldier

The Romans and the Pergamenese arrived at the city of Gordion and found it deserted, however, they still destroyed it.[34] As they camped there, they received a messenger sent by Eposognatus. The messenger reported that Eposognatus had failed in persuading the Galatians not to attack and that they were mustering nearby in the mountains.[31]

The Tolistobogii and the Trocmi, the latter under the command of their chief Gaulotos, occupied Mount Olympus, while the Tectosagi went to another mountain.[35][36] On Mount Olympus, the Galatians had fortified themselves with a ditch and other defensive works.[37][33] For the first two days, the Romans scouted the mountains. On their first patrol, the Romans were attacked by the Galatian cavalry, who outnumbered the Roman cavalry guarding the patrol by two times and pushed the Romans back to their camp.[34]

On the third day, the Romans attacked the Galatian position with their light infantry from Thrace and Trallia. The Roman auxiliary archers, slingers and javelinists inflicted heavy losses on the poorly armored Galatians, while those who attempted to get into close combat were overcome by the superior weapons and armor of the Roman velites.[38] When the Roman legionaries finally stormed the Galatian camp, the defenders fled down the mountains; many fell down cliffs or succumbed to attacks by the Roman allied cavalry at the foothills.[39] The Galatians lost 40,000 people dead or captured, Grainger notes that even Livy, whose numbers are unreliable, had doubted these figures.[40] A Roman unit later arrived at the camp to retrieve the loot.[41]

Battle of Ancyra

After the Roman victory at Mount Olympus, the Tectosagi under the command of their chief Komboiomaros asked to meet Vulso for a conference halfway between their camp and Ancyra. The main aim of the conference was for the Tectosagi to delay the Roman attack so that they could allow their women and children to retreat across the Halys River. Their other aim was to assassinate Manlius while he was at the conference. While they were going to the conference, the Romans saw the Galatian cavalry charging at them. In the skirmish that followed, the Galatians overpowered Manlius' small cavalry escort due to their numbers but were driven back when the cavalry that had been accompanying the Roman foragers arrived and forced the Galatians to retreat.[42][41]

The Romans spent the next two days scouting the surrounding area and on the third day they met the Galatian army consisting of 50,000 men, Grainger is sceptical of this number. The Galatian cavalry had been deployed on the flanks, but had been employed as infantry. The Romans started the battle by attacking again with their light infantry. The Galatians were once again attacked by long range weapons, the Galatian center broke due to the first charge of the legions and fled to their camp. The flanks stood their grounds for longer but were eventually forced to retreat.[43] The Romans chased them and plundered the Galatian camp[44] as the surviving Galatians fled across the river to join the women, children and the Trocmi.[45]

Aftermath

These two crushing military defeats forced the Galatians to sue for peace. This campaign greatly enriched Vulso and his legions as the Galatians had gathered great wealth through their many conquests in Asia Minor. The Galatians sent envoys to Vulso asking for peace but because winter was approaching, he asked them to come to Ephesus.[45]

Vulso remained in Asia Minor for another year. During that time he concluded the Treaty of Apamea with Antiochus and divided the lands of the Asia Minor coast between Pergamum and Rhodes.[46] When the Galatian envoys came, Vulso told them that King Eumenes II of Pergamum would give them the terms of the peace when he returned from Rome.[47]

Vulso began his return journey to Rome in 188 BC and arrived in 187 BC. When he returned to Rome, he received much criticism because of his unauthorised war against the Galatians.[48] However, he eventually overcame the arguments and was awarded a triumph by the Senate.[49][50]

Analysis

The historian John D. Grainger noted that most historians had accepted Livy's account of the war without critical analysis. Grainger notes that Livy had cited his account of the war to Lucius Furius Purpureo and Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, both of whom were political enemies of Vulso.[51] Grainger also notes that Livy, in all likelihood, had overstated the numbers of the Galatian combatants. He argues that Vulso had been sent to attack the Galatians only as a front, and that the actual intent was to use the presence of Roman troops on Seleucid territories to claim those territories for Rome and the allies.[52] Grainger claims that this theory is proved by the fact that Manlius had the powers to negotiate with the Galatians and all other kingdoms east of the Taurus Mountains, which he wouldn't have had without approval from the Senate.[53]

Livy had noted that a combined total of 4000 soldiers from Morzius, the prince of Paphlagonia, and king Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia had been present near Ancyra.[54] Grainger argues that these forces, allies of the Galatians and Seleucids, could have pulled the Romans into a war further into the Seleucid inner territories, where they would have difficulty defending themselves against an attack by the Seleucids and their allies. Grainger further argues that only when a peace with the Seleucids was finally concluded did Manlius move from his position near Galatia, where could have performed a flanking movement on any Seleucid reinforcements or armies from Syria.[53]

Grainger used details provided by Livy to calculate the total loot during the campaigns in Asia Minor. Vulso's share of the loot was estimated at 26.3 talents of gold and 264.1 talents of silver;[55] while his expenses on soldier pay during the campaign were estimated at 308 talents or 18 million denarii.[56]

Grainger notes that the Galatians had followed plans and their commanders had maintained control during both battles. He cites Livy who had observed that the Galatians had relied entirely on passive defenses against a possible siege, but had not armed themselves with long range ballistic weapons. However, their cavalry force had been very effective,[33] but they had used it erringly at Ancyra as infantry.[44] Grainger argues that the strategy of the Galatians had been to keep the Roman army in the vicinity of their mountainous strongholds till winter arrived, when they would be cut off.[44] However, he notes that the Galatians had been either incompetent at or unaware of military tactics and the weapons in use at the time. He notes that the Galatians opted for mountain warfare even though their cavalry could have been used more impactfully on open fields. He uses these facts to posit that the Galatians had given up the raids they were known for.

Citations

  1. ^ Livy 35.43 Archived 2007-09-29 at the Wayback Machine
  2. ^ Livy 36.19 Archived 2008-05-17 at the Wayback Machine
  3. ^ Livy 36.21 Archived 2008-05-17 at the Wayback Machine
  4. ^ Livy 37.44 Archived 2009-03-27 at the Wayback Machine
  5. ^ Livy 37.45 Archived 2009-03-27 at the Wayback Machine
  6. ^ a b c d Smith, Sir William; Lawrence, Eugene (1889). A Smaller History of Rome. Rome: John Murray. p. 112.
  7. ^ a b c d Livy 38.12 Archived 2009-06-17 at the Wayback Machine
  8. ^ a b Pennell[broken anchor] [1]
  9. ^ Grainger 1995, pp. 25, 29.
  10. ^ Livy, p. 38.12.2. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  11. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 28.
  12. ^ Livy, p. 38.51.10. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  13. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 25.
  14. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 26.
  15. ^ Livy, p. 38.12.8. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  16. ^ Livy, p. 38.13.3. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  17. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 33.
  18. ^ Livy, p. 38.13.5 - 38.13.10. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  19. ^ Livy, p. 38.13.11 - 38.14.1. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  20. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 34.
  21. ^ Polybius, p. 21.34. sfn error: no target: CITEREFPolybius (help)
  22. ^ Livy, p. 38.14.3. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  23. ^ a b Polybius, p. 21.35. sfn error: no target: CITEREFPolybius (help)
  24. ^ a b Grainger 1995, p. 35.
  25. ^ Polybius, p. 21.36. sfn error: no target: CITEREFPolybius (help)
  26. ^ Grainger 1995, pp. 33, 35.
  27. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 35, fn. 3.
  28. ^ Livy, p. 38.15.12 - 38.15.15. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  29. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 36.
  30. ^ a b Livy 38.18 Archived 2009-06-17 at the Wayback Machine
  31. ^ a b c Livy, p. 38.18. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  32. ^ Grainger 2020, p. 159-160.
  33. ^ a b c Grainger 2020, p. 161.
  34. ^ a b Grainger 2020, p. 162.
  35. ^ Livy, p. 38.19. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  36. ^ Grainger 2020, p. 160.
  37. ^ Livy, p. 38.20. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  38. ^ Livy, p. 38.21. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  39. ^ Livy, p. 38.22. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  40. ^ Livy, p. 38.23. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  41. ^ a b Grainger 2020, p. 163.
  42. ^ Livy, p. 38.25. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  43. ^ Livy, p. 38.26. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  44. ^ a b c Grainger 2020, p. 164.
  45. ^ a b Livy, p. 38.27. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  46. ^ Livy, pp. 38.38–38.39. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  47. ^ Livy, p. 38.37. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  48. ^ Livy, p. 38.45. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  49. ^ Livy, p. 38.50. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  50. ^ Pelikan Pittenger, Miriam R. (2009). Contested Triumphs: Politics, Pageantry, and Performance in Livy’s Republican Rome. University of California Press. pp. 98–100. ISBN 9780520942776.
  51. ^ Grainger 1995, pp. 23, fn. 1, 24.
  52. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 38.
  53. ^ a b Grainger 1995, p. 39.
  54. ^ Livy, p. 38.26.4. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  55. ^ Livy, p. 39.7.1 - 39.7.2. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLivy (help)
  56. ^ Grainger 1995, p. 42.

References

Primary sources

  • Livy, translated by Henry Bettison, (1976). Rome and the Mediterranean. London: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044318-5.
  • Polybius, translated by Frank W. Walbank, (1979). The Rise of the Roman Empire. New York: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044362-2.

On-line sources

  • Mommsen, Theodor (2004-05-01). "A History of Rome. Vol III". Project Gutenberg. Retrieved 2007-07-16.
  • Pennell, Robert (2004-11-01). "Ancient Rome : from the earliest times down to 476 A. D." Project Gutenberg. Retrieved 2007-07-16.
  • Smith, William (2006-11-01). "A Smaller History of Rome". Project Gutenberg. Retrieved 2007-07-16.
  • Grainger, John D. (1995). "The Campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor". Anatolian Studies. 45: 23–43. JSTOR 3642912.
  • Grainger, John D. (2020). The Galatians: Celtic Invaders of Greece and Asia Minor. Pen & Sword Books. ISBN 9781526770714.
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